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NEtwork Digest analysis
by means of association rules
Daniele Apiletti, Elena Baralis, Tania Cerquitelli, Vincenzo D'Elia
Abstract- The continuous growth in connection speed al-
lows huge amounts of data to be transferred through a net-
work. An important issue in this context is network traf-
fic analysis to profile communications and detect security
threats. Association rule extraction is a widely used ex-
ploratory technique which has been exploited in different
contexts (e.g., network traffic characterization). However,
to discover (potentially relevant) knowledge a very low sup-
port threshold needs to be enforced hence generating a large
number of unmanageable rules. To address this issue in net-
work traffic analysis, an efficient technique to reduce traffic
volume is needed.
This paper presents a NEtwork Digest framework, which
performs network traffic analysis by means of data mining
techniques to characterize traffic data and detect anomalies.
NED exploits continuous queries to efficiently perform real-
time aggregation of captured network data and supports fil-
tering operations to further reduce traffic volume focusing
on relevant data. Furthermore, NED provides an efficient
algorithm to perform refinement analysis by means of asso-
ciation rules to discover traffic features. Extracted rules al-
low traffic data characterization in terms of correlation and
recurrence of feature patterns. Preliminary experimental
results performed on different network dumps showed the
efficiency and effectiveness of the NED framework to char-
acterize traffic data.
Index Terms- Association rules, Continuous queries, Net-
work traffic analysis, Stream analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the continuous growth in network speed, ter-
abytes of data may be transferred through a network every
day. Thus, two major issues hamper network data capture
and analysis: (i) A huge amount of data can be collected
in a very short time (e.g., an Ethernet frame at 10Gbps is
received in less than 70ns). (ii) It is hard to identify cor-
relations and detect anomalies in real-time on such large
network traffic traces. New efficient techniques able to deal
with huge network traffic data need to be devised.
A significant effort has been devoted to the application of
data mining techniques to network traffic analysis [6]. The
application domains include studying correlations among
data (e.g., association rule extraction for network traffic
characterization [4], [11] or for router misconfiguration de-
tection [14]), extracting information for prediction (e.g.,
multilevel traffic classification [13] , Naive Bayes classifica-
tion [16]), grouping network data with similar properties
(e.g., clustering algorithms for intrusion detection [18], or
for classification [7], [9], [21], [15]). While classification al-
gorithms require previous knowledge of the application do-
main (e.g., a labeled traffic trace), association rule extrac-
tion does not. Hence, the latter is a widely used exploratory
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technique to highlight hidden knowledge in network flows.
The extraction process is driven by enforcing a minimum
frequency (Le., support) constraint on the mined correla-
tions. However to discover (potentially relevant) knowledge
a very low support constraint has to be enforced hence gen-
erating a huge number of unmanageable rules [4]. To ad-
dress this issue, a network digest representation for traffic
data is needed. Continuous queries are an efficient tech-
nique to perform real-time aggregation and filtering, thus
they can be exploited to effectively reduce traffic volume.
A new approach jointly taking advantage of both continu-
ous queries and association rules could efficiently perform
network traffic analysis.
This leads to the proposed framework, called NED,
which performs network traffic analysis by means of data
mining techniques to characterize traffic data and detect
anomalies. NED performs (i) On-line stream analysis to ag-
gregate and filter network traffic, and (ii) refinement anal-
ysis to discover relationships among captured data. NED
allows on-line stream analysis concurrently with data cap-
ture by means of user-defined continuous queries. This step
reduces the amount of network data, thus obtaining mean-
ingful network digests for pattern discovery. Furthermore,
NED provides a refinement analysis to discover traffic fea-
tures from network digests by means of association rule ex-
traction. NED's final output is a set of association rules [12]
which are able to characterize network traffic and to show
correlation and recurrence of patterns among data. Prelim-
inary experimental results performed on different network
dumps showed the efficiency and effectiveness of the NED
framework in characterizing traffic data and highlighting
meaningful features.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
an overview of the NED framework. While Section III de-
scribes the network traffic stream analysis performed by
means of continuous queries, Section IV presents the re-
finement analysis phase. In Section V experiments to val-
idate the proposed framework are reported. Section VI
draws conclusions and presents future developments of the
proposed approach.
II. OVERVIEW
NED (NEtwork Digest) is a framework to efficiently per-
form network traffic analysis. NED addresses two main
issues: (i) Data stream processing to reduce the amount of
traffic data and allow a more effective use, both in time
and space, of data analysis techniques, (ii) Hidden knowl-
edge extraction from traffic data to characterize network
traffic, detect anomalies, and identify recurrent patterns.
Data stream processing is performed concurrently with
data capture by means of continuous queries, whereas hid-
den knowledge is extracted from the stored continuous
query results in a refinement analysis step, which currently
implements an efficient association rule mining algorithm.
Other data mining techniques [12] may be easily integrated
in this step.
Continuous queries perform aggregation (Le., similar
records can be summarized by a proper digest) and jiltering
(Le., meaningless data for the current analysis is discarded)
of network traffic. Their results can be stored on disk for
several refinement analysis sessions. Eventually, meaning-
ful knowledge is extracted in the refinement analysis session
in the form of association rules, e.g. rules which represent
correlations and implications among network traffic data.
Stream
analysis:
cont1nuous
queries
Fig. 1. NED's architecture
Figure 1 shows NED's main blocks: Data stream pro-
cessing and refinement analysis. Captured traffic packets
are the input stream of the continuous query block, whose
objectives are (i) summarizing the traffic while preserving
structural similarities among temporally contiguous pack-
ets and (ii) discarding meaningless traffic to reduce traffic
volume. The output flows (Le., filtered and aggregated
packet digests) can be saved into a permanent data store.
The storage is required only when different refinement anal-
ysis sessions need to be performed. The refinement analy-
sis is a two step process: (i) An optional data stream view
block selects a suitable user-defined subset of flows to focus
the following analysis on. (ii) Association rule extraction is
performed either on the data stream view, which contains
the selected flows, or on all the flows in the permanent data
store. The aim of the refinement analysis is to discover
interesting correlations, recurrent patterns and anomalies
among traffic data. Association rule analysis is currently
implemented, but the framework allows different analysis
techniques to be easily integrated.
To describe NED we will use a running example, which
will be validated on real datasets in Section V.
III. DATA STREAM PROCESSING
The data stream processing block of NED reduces the
volume of traffic data by grouping similar packets and dis-
carding irrelevant ones. Network traffic can be considered
as a stream of structured data. Each packet is a record
whose attributes are defined by network protocols. In
our running example, the available attributes are source
and destination IP addresses, source and destination TCP
ports, the level 4 protocol (e.g., TCP, UDP) and the size
of the packet. Since packets are captured as an unbounded
stream, a conventional aggregation process would never ter-
minate. To overcome this issue, continuous queries [3] are
exploited and CQL (Continuous Query Language [2]) is
used. Queries are issued once and then logically run contin-
uously over a sliding window of the original stream. Hence,
the following parameters need to be defined: (i) Aggrega-
tion and filtering rules expressed in a subset of SQL in-
structions, (ii) a sliding window, whose length is expressed
in seconds, which identifies the current set of data on which
rules are applied, (iii) the step Step ~ length, which defines
how often the window moves and the output is produced.
In NED a record produced as output by the continuous
query is a flow, which summarizes a group of similar and
temporally contiguous packets, as shown in the following
examples.
Example 1: Figure 2(a) reports a toy packet capture to
describe how the sample query works. The length of win-
dow length is 6 UOT (Units Of Time) and the output is
produced every 2 UOT (Step == 2 UOT). Figure 2(b) shows
the output produced by the continuous query and how the
window evolves. Some steps are not reported due to lack
of space. I
Three types of continuous queries are implemented in
NED (see Section III-A, III-B, and III-C for more details).
To improve CQL query readability, aggregation queries
and filtering queries are decoupled (see Figure 3). Aggrega-
tion is performed concurrently with data capturing, while
filtering can be executed both on line and off line. The
packet filtering is performed in the stream analysis block
and discards meaningless packets from the aggregation,
whereas flow filtering is performed in the data stream view
block and discards undesired flows for the specific analysis
purpose.
A. Query 1
The purpose of Query 1 is to reduce the volume of traffic
data while preserving information about TCP flows, their
participants, their size and their fragmentation.
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B. Query 2
This query targets the extraction of the longest IP traffic
flows. Once packets have been aggregated by source ad-
dress and destination address, flows whose length is lower
than a given threshold are discarded. The threshold is ex-
pressed as a percentage of the total traffic of the current
window. Both filtering and aggregation considerably re-
duce the dataset size.
c. Query 3
This query targets the recognition of unconventional
TCP traffic, which is usually exchanged on ports different
from the well-known ones (Le., port number> 1024).
(a) A toy packet capture
Ti:rne Current flows OutputSource Size
0 A sizeA,o -
1 A ~iE{O,l}sizeA,i -
2 A l:::iE{O,l}sizeA i -
B S'lZeB,2
6 A L.:iE{O,1,3,6}sizeA i {A,B}
B ~iE{2,4,5}sizeB i
7 A ~iE {1,3,6}sizeA i -
B
L.:iE{2,4,5,7}S ize B i
A
L.:iE{3,6}SiZ e A i8 {A,B,C}
B ~iE {2,4,5,7}size B,i
C S'lZeC,8
(b) Flows in window
Fig. 2. Packet aggregation: length = 6, Step = 2
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Aggregate
source-IP,destination-IP,
Sum(size) as flow-size
Count(*) as packets
Packets [Range 6 seconds]
level3 = 'IP'
source-IP,destination-IP
Filter
source-IP, destination-IP, flow-size
Aggregate
flow-size > ratio *
(Select S~m(flow-size) From Aggregate)
Aggregate
source-IP,source-Port,destination-IP,
destination-Port, Sum(size) as flow-size
Count(*) as packets
Packets [Range 6 seconds]
level4 = 'TCP'
source-IP,source-Port,destination-IP,
destination-Port
Since this query targets all TCP flows in network traffic,
it does not perform any data filtering, but simply aggre-
gates by IP source address, TCP source port, IP destina-
tion address, and TCP destination port. It also computes
the total size and the number of packets of the flow.
< .,', pkt m,pkt m+l, ... >
Port-Filtering
*
Size-Filtering
*
Aggregate
source-Port > 1024 And
destination-Port> 1024
Port-Filtering
flow-size > ratio *
(Select S~m(flow-size)From Port-Filtering)
Select
From
Where
Select
From
Where
Query 3 has two filtering stages. Firstly, only flows which
do not have well-known ports as source and destination
are kept. Secondly, the longest flows are selected. If these
two filtering stages are both performed in the continuous
query, the output flows are significantly reduced, but differ-
ent analysis types become unfeasible. To avoid this limita-
tion, filters may be applied in the data stream view block.
IV. REFINEMENT ANALYSIS
NED discovers interesting correlations and recurrent pat-
terns in network traffic data by means of association rule
mining, which is performed in the refinement analysis
phase.
Let Traffic be a network traffic dataset whose generic
record Flow is a set of Feature. Each Feature, also called
item, is a couple (attribute, value). An attribute models a
characteristic of the flow (e.g, source address, destination
port). Such a Traffic dataset is available in the NED data
store, Le., the input of the refinement analysis block.
Association rules identify collections of itemsets (Le., sets
of Feature) that are statistically related (Le., frequent) in
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Fig. 3. Pipeline of continuous queries
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Since the complete dataset contains hundreds of flows,
the support of the SYN-flooding rule may be too low to be
relevant. To overcome this issue, the output of the previous
continuous query may be appropriately filtered. Since we
are interested in flows whose size is lower than a threshold
x expressed in bytes, the following query may be exploited
to create a data stream view.
Filter
Select source-IP, source-Port ,destination-IP,
destination-Port, flow-size
From Aggregate
Where flow-size < x
the underlying dataset. An association rule is represented
in the form X => Y where X and Yare disjoint conjunc-
tions of Feature. Rule quality is usually measured by sup-
port and confidence. Support is the percentage of items
containing both X and Y. It describes the statistical rel-
evance of a rule. Confidence is the conditional probability
of finding Y given X. It describes the strength of the im-
plication. Association rule mining is a two-step process:
(i) Frequent itemset extraction and (ii) association rule
generation from frequent itemsets.
Given a support threshold s%, an itemset (i.e., a set of
Feature) is said frequent if it appears in at least s% of flows.
Example 2: Consider the toy dataset in Fig. 2(a) for the
itemset mining process. With a support threshold greater
than 25%, the 2-itemsets
Select
From
Where
Group By
Aggregate
source-IP,source-Port,destination-IP,
destination-Port, Sum(size) as flow-size
Packets [Range 6 seconds]
level4 = 'TCP'
source-IP,source-Port,destination-IP,
destination-Port
{( dest addr : DAl), (dest p : DPl)}, S{DAl,DPl} = 50%
(1)
{( dest addr : DA2), (dest p : DPl)}, S{DA2,DPl} = 50%
The refinement analysis, performed on the results of the
described data stream view, extracts a small number of as-
sociation rules characterized by high support. These rules
highlight more effectively any specific traffic behavior. I
V. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
A set of preliminary experiments have been performed
by analyzing NED behavior on real datasets. We assessed
(i) the number of extracted association rules and (ii) the
interest of mined rules.
TABLE I
NETWORK TRAFFIC DATASETS
are frequent. Hence, the flows directed to DA2 or DA1 at
port DP1 are frequent.
Once mined frequent itemset, association rules [1], [12]
are used to analyze their correlations. Given the itemsets
in (1), the following association rule
{( dest addr : DAI )} =:;> {( dest p : DPl)}
{
s% support
c% confidence
states that (dest p : DP1) appears in c% of Flow which
contains also (dest addr : D Al ). I
ID
A
B
C
NUlllber of Packets
25969389
24763699
26023835
Size (Mbyte]
2621
2500
2625
A. Data stream view
The data stream view block allows to select a subset
of the flows obtained as continuous query output. The
following example, focusing on the SYN flooding attack,
shows its usefulness.
Example 3: The SYN flooding attack occurs when a vic-
tim host receives more incomplete connection requests that
it can handle. To make this attack more difficult to detect,
the source host randomizes the source IP address of the
packets used in the attack. An attempt of SYN flood-
ing [10] can be recognized by mining rules in the form
{ victim-IP, victim-port} => size
{
s% support
c% confidence
where the left term is the victim fingerprint, while the right
part is the size of the flow which is supposed to be very
small. The frequency of this pattern is measured by means
of support s and confidence c.
Suppose that, to reduce the amount of stored data, the
network traffic has been aggregated with respect to address
and port of both source and destination. For each flow the
size is computed (e.g. packets differing in one of these fea-
tures belong to different flows). This step is performed by
running the following continuous query on the data stream.
Three real datasets have been obtained by performing
different capture stages using the Analyzer traffic tool [17]
on a backbone link of our campus network. We will re-
fer to each dataset using the ID shown in Table I, where
the number of packets and the size of each dataset is also
reported.
Experiments target the execution of the queries discussed
in Section III. They have been performed by considering
three window lengths (60 s, 120 s, and 180 s) and two link
speeds (10 Mbps and 100 Mbps). The value of the window
window length f
step Step has been set to 2 . Due to lack 0
space, reported results refer to experiments performed with
100 Mbps link speed and 60 s window length. The ratio
parameter of Queries 2 and 3 has been set to 0.1.
To avoid discarding packets, a proper buffer size has to
be determined. The buffer must be able to store all possi-
ble flows in a time window, whose worst case value is the
maximum number of captured packets (i.e., each packet
belongs to a different flow). Thus, the buffer size has been
set to the following number of flows.
. link speed * window length
szze == -----------
minimum size of a packet
Frequent itemset extraction is based on the LCM
v.2 algorithm [20] (FIMI'04 best implementation algo-
rithm), while association rule generation is performed using
Goethal's implementation of the Apriori algorithm [5].
Experiments have been performed on a 2800 Mhz Pen-
tium IV PC with 2 Gb main memory running Linux (kernel
2.7.81). All reported execution times are real times, includ-
ing both system and user times. They have been obtained
using the Linux time command as in [8].
A. Query 1
Query 1 (Section III-A) aggregates packets with respect
to source address, source port, destination address and des-
tination port. Thus, it significantly reduces the data car-
dinality, while preserving general traffic features.
Figure 4(a) reports the number of extracted rules for
each dataset considering different support and confidence
thresholds. Since the three datasets have similar behav-
ior, we focus on dataset A, where we observe that some
1-itemsets are highly frequent, such as (source - address:
130.192.a.b) and (destination-address: 130.192.a.b) 1 To
further investigate the meaning of the rules, we consider
the following examples.
Example 4: Considering minimum support s 2:: 0.1%
and minimum confidence c 2:: 50% leads to the extraction
of a large amount of rules in the following form.
{( *-port : x )}
JJ-
{( *-address : 130.192.a.b)}
Since port x is frequent (regardless of the port number),
these rules state that the address 130.192.a.b (i) generates
remarkable traffic both as receiver and as transmitter, (ii) it
is likely to be a server which provides many services, be-
cause it uses a wide range of ports. We can conclude that
130.192.a.b is probably the public IP address of a router
implementing NAT. An inspection of the network topology
confirms such result. I
Figure 4(a) reports the number of extracted rules when
varying support and confidence thresholds. For Query 1,
as reported in Figure 4(a), by enforcing high support and
confidence thresholds, the number of extracted patterns
decreases. The decreasing trend is particularly evident for
high support thresholds, whereas most of the rules have
high confidence values for any support threshold. Thus, in
this scenario, support is more selective in filtering patterns.
Example 5: By setting the minimum support to 0.3%
and the minimum confidence to 0.5%, some interesting pat-
terns are extracted. NAT rules are still present, and other
rules become more evident. For example
{( source-address: 130.192.c.d)}
JJ-
{( source-port : 443 )}
{
s == 0.3%
c == 99%
1The actual IP addresses have been masked for privacy reasons.
identifies 130.192.c.d as an https server. It was confirmed
to be the student webmail server.
{(destination-port: 6101 )
(flow-size: 96)}
JJ-
{( source-address: x.y.z.w )}
{
s == 0.3%
c == 98%
highlights that Synchronet-rtc service is frequently and
mostly used by x.y.z.w. I
Analyses performed on rules extracted from datasets B
and C confirm the results obtained on dataset A. The traf-
fic network features, inferred from the rules, highlight the
same NAT routing and servers.
To identify patterns arising from long flows, another step
of filtering is required. This issue, addressed by the second
query, has been analyzed in the next section.
B. Query 2
The second query (Section III-B) selects the flows which
generate an amount of traffic greater than a certain per-
centage of the total traffic in a window. The aim is to
describe more accurately rules extracted by Query 1.
Figure 4(b) shows the number of association rules ex-
tracted from the results of Query 2 applied to the datasets
A, B, and C. Rules discovered in this case predominantly
have the following form.
{( source address: SA),
(source port: SP)}
JJ-
{( destination address: D A ),
( destination port: D P )}
Many extracted rules describe general network features
such as NAT routing or main servers. Furthermore, this
analysis assesses the pervasiveness of different services.
Mined rules highlight the importance of several protocols
like netrjs, systat and QMTP in the examined network.
Some rules are worth further investigation. Many flows
have source and destination ports> 1024. This fact may
highlight unconventional traffic, such as peer-to-peer com-
munications. Another filtering step is necessary to clearly
identify involved hosts. This issue has been addressed by
Query 3.
c. Query 3
The third query (Section III-C) extracts long flows whose
source and destination ports are beyond 1024.
Figure 4(c) shows the number of association rules ex-
tracted from the result of Query 3 applied to datasets A,
B, and C. Because of the additional filtering step, the num-
ber of rules is significantly lower than the ones extracted
by Query 1 and Query 2. Furthermore, these rules are even
more specific than previous ones, as shown by the following
example.
Example 6: Consider the following rule.
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(a) Query 1 (b) Query 2
Fig. 4. Number of extracted association rules
(c) Query 3
{( source-address: 130.192.e.f)}
JJ,
{( destination-port: 4662)}
{
s == 1.98%
c == 77%
The address 130.192.e.f is identified as having a remark-
able amount of traffic toward remote hosts on port 4662.
Since this is the default port for eDonkey2000 servers [19]
of the ED2K peer to peer network, we can conclude that (i)
the source host is exchanging data with the ED2K servers,
and (ii) its amount of traffic on not well-known ports is
mainly related to such peer to peer network. I
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
NED is a framework to efficiently perform network traffic
analysis. NED provides techniques to perform data stream
analysis and refinement analysis. The former reduces the
amount of traffic data while the latter automatically ex-
tracts correlation and recurrence of patterns among traffic
data.
Association rule extraction algorithms do not easily de-
tect patterns nested in rare flows, even if they might be rel-
evant. Hence future developments of the NED framework
will explore generalized association rules. Generalized as-
sociation rules could represent network traffic at a higher
level of abstraction and could become a more powerful tool
to efficiently extract hidden knowledge not captured by tra-
ditional approaches.
VII. ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We are grateful to Fulvio Risso for providing the real
traffic datasets captured from the campus network.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Agrawal and R. Srikant. Fast Algorithms for Mining Associ-
ation Rules in Large Databases. Proceedings of the 20th Inter-
national Conference on Very Large Data Bases, pages 487-499,
1994.
[2] A. Arasu, S. Babu, and J. Widom. The CQL continuous
query language: semantic foundations and query execution. The
VLDB Journal The International Journal on Very Large Data
Bases, 15(2):121-142, 2006.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
S. Babu and J. Widom. Continuous queries over data streams.
ACM SIGMOD Record, 30(3):109-120, 2001.
M. Baldi, E. Baralis, F. Risso, and D. e Inf. Data mining tech-
niques for effective and scalable traffic analysis. Integrated N et-
work Management, 2005. 1M 2005. 2005 9th IFIP/IEEE Inter-
national Symposium on, pages 105-118, 2005.
Bart Goethals. Frequent Pattern Mining Implementations.
Available at http://www.adrem.ua.ac.be/goethals/software.
K. Burn-Thornton, J. Garibaldi, and A. Mahdi. Pro-active net-
work management using data mining. Global Telecommunica-
tions Conference, 1998. GLOBECOM 98.,2,1998.
J. Erman, M. Arlitt, and A. Mahanti. Traffic classification using
clustering algorithms. In MineNet '06, pages 281-286, New York,
NY, USA, 2006. ACM Press.
FIMI. http://fimi.cs.helsinki.fi/ .
Y. Guan, A. Ghorbani, and N. Belacel. Y-Means: A cluster-
ing method for intrusion detection. Proceedings of Canadian
Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering, pages 4-7,
2003.
B. Harris and R. Hunt. TCP/IP security threats and attack
methods. Computer Communications, 22(10):885-897, 1999.
M. Hossain, S. Bridges, and R. Vaughn Jr. Adaptive intrusion
detection with data mining. IEEE Internation Conference on
Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 4, 2003.
Jiawei Han and Micheline Kamber. Data Mining: Concepts and
Techniques. Series Editor Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. The
Morgan Kaufmann Series in Data Management Systems, Jim
Gray, August 2000.
T. Karagiannis, K. Papagiannaki, and M. Faloutsos. Blinc: mul-
tilevel traffic classification in the dark. In SIGCOMM, pages
229-240, 2005.
F. Le, S. Lee, T. Wong, H. S. Kim, and D. Newcomb. Miner-
als: using data mining to detect router misconfigurations. In
MineNet '06, pages 293-298, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM
Press.
W. Lee and S. Stolfo. A framework for constructin features
and models for intrusion detection systems. A CM Transactions
on Information and System Security (TISSEC) , 3(4):227-261,
2000.
A. W. Moore and D. Zuev. Internet traffic classification using
bayesian analysis techniques. In SIGMETRICS '05, pages 50-
60, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM Press.
NetGroup, Politecnico di Torino. Analyzer 3.0. Available at
http://analyzer.polito.it/30alpha/ .
L. Portnoy, E. Eskin, and S. Stolfo. Intrusion detection with un-
labeled data using clustering. Proceedings of ACM CSS Work-
shop on Data Mining Applied to Security, PA" November, 2001.
The SANS Institute. Port 4662 details. Available at
http://isc.sans.org/port .html?port=4662.
T. Uno, M. Kiyomi, and H. Arimura. LCM ver. 2: Efficient min-
ing algorithms for frequent/closed/maximal itemsets. In FIMI,
2004.
Q. Wang and V. Megalooikonomu. A clustering algorithm for
intrusion detection. Proc. SPIE, 5812:31-38, 2005.
